Abstract-RF distinct native attribute (RF-DNA) fingerprinting is introduced as a means to uniquely identify embedded processors and other integrated circuit devices by passively monitoring and exploiting unintentional RF emissions. Device discrimination is accomplished using RF-DNA fingerprints comprised of higher-order statistical features based on instantaneous amplitude and frequency responses as a device executes a sequence of operations. The resultant fingerprints are input to a Multiple Discriminant Analysis/Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML) processor for subsequent device discrimination. Using devices from a given manufacturer and experimentally collected side channel signals, 90-100% identification accuracy is achieved for SNR ≥ 12 dB for devices with identical part numbers from the same production lot. Depending on the level of required classification accuracy, RF-DNA fingerprinting is well-suited for realistic environments and practical operating distances. Applications of device RF-DNA fingerprints include supplementary physical layer authentication of secure tokens (e.g. smart cards), detection of counterfeit electronic devices or unauthorized modification, and forensic attribution of a device's unique identity in criminal or other investigations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Establishing trust through authentication of individuals or devices is an important, but exceptionally difficult problem. There are a wide variety of scenarios where it is desirable to ensure that a system and its components are authentic and have not been tampered with in any way. The establishment of trust is a prerequisite for cryptographic and other secure systems, but is also important to ensure subsystems and their components are trustworthy and have not been tampered with in other critical applications-particularly those involving human safety. Secure tokens and other essential system components may be counterfeited, duplicated, or have PIN numbers, passwords, or other cryptographic key material extracted. Mobile environments exacerbate the problem since requirements for small size, low cost, and low power consumption severely restrict the types of security mechanisms mobile tokens can incorporate. Such tokens are frequently based on inexpensive, high-volume commercial micro-controllers in a smart card or secure "key fob" form factor where implementation security may have been a relatively low design priority. An extensive body of academic and commercial research dedicated to the examination of the physical security of cryptographic and other secure devices has emerged in the last decade under the titles side channel analysis and fault analysis [1] - [3] .
This work introduces a promising technique to enhance security schemes through supplementary physical layer device identification. Applications include verification of the authenticity of secure tokens and other critical system components; detection of counterfeit parts or unauthorized modifications to sensitive electronics; and forensic attribution of a device's unique identity in criminal or other investigations.
This work is motivated by successful application of MDA/ML-based radio frequency distinct native attribute (RF-DNA) fingerprinting to identify commercial communication devices (e.g., 802.11a/g, GSM, etc.) [4] - [6] . Previous results have shown the intentional emissions of RF communications equipment are colored by device specific modulation effects. The features of this coloration have been exploited to accurately identify part number and in some cases the unique serial number of the source device.
Herein, the RF-DNA feature extraction technique is extended to the identification of non-communications devices such as micro-controllers and embedded systems. It is widely known that all electronic devices leak electromagnetic (EM) energy during normal operation-thus the announcement to turn off all electronic devices before takeoff of a commercial airline flight to prevent interference with critical flight systems. The problem considered here is whether those unintentional emissions contain features which are unique enough to allow individual chips to be distinguished from all othersincluding those that share the same part number or even those manufactured from the same silicon wafer under near identical conditions. Stated more generically, the question being investigated is "Do the unintentional RF emissions produced by a circuit contain information that can uniquely identify the producing device?"
The results herein are necessarily limited, and do not consider all possible device manufacturers, models, or engagement scenarios. However, the results obtained thus far are very promising and indicate additional work is warranted.
II. UNINTENTIONAL RF EMISSIONS OF INTEGRATED CIRCUITS
All electronic circuits produce unintentional electromagnetic emissions as a byproduct of their operation. Although these emissions can span the full EM spectrum, in this study the analysis is restricted to emissions in the radio frequency (RF) band.
A significant source of unintentional RF emissions in modern microprocessors is the switching activity of transistors used to control the propagation path of data through the circuit. Most modern integrated circuits, including generaland special-purpose embedded micro-controllers, are based on complementary metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS) transistor technology. As operations are executed and data is processed, the individual CMOS transistors switch on and off, dynamically producing variations in current flow due to the charging and discharging of intrinsic capacitances, momentary shortcircuits created during transition between states, and glitching activity of the logic cells encountered before the circuit settles into its intended steady-state output [7] . The variations in current activity produce electromagnetic (EM) fields that combine through complex interactions and propagate via both radiation and conduction (to the power supply and ground lines as well as other conductive materials) in the form of timevarying EM waves. The fundamental nature of these effects is well understood as described by Maxwell's equations [1] .
The EM emanations induced by circuit operation can be grouped into two primary categories-direct and indirect [1] . Direct emanations are created by the switching activity in the transistors or other solid state devices and the resulting current flow through a circuit's intended current path. Indirect emanations are created when small couplings between densely packed electronic components modulate existing carrier signals (both intentional and unintentional) emitted from the device, e.g. those due to harmonics of the system clock frequency [1] . The results herein were obtained by focusing on the direct emanations.
A. Device-Dependent Variations in Unintentional Emissions
Although integrated circuit fabrication is necessarily very precise, the processes used still introduce variations in the final device structure on a very small scale (deep sub-micron in modern IC technology). Thus, like snowflakes or human fingerprints, no two chips are exactly alike. As long as variations are within acceptable tolerances, the device will operate correctly from a black-box perspective.
The objective of this study is to determine whether the tiny structural variations that make integrated circuits unique also color the inherent electromagnetic leakage of the device in a manner that is exploitable to identify the source with a high degree of accuracy. Previous RF-DNA fingerprinting research demonstrates that the communications signals from devices such as cellular phones and wireless networking equipment have features that are unique to the particular device that produced them. Our hypothesis is that the small-scale variations in the physical structure of each unique integrated circuit will similarly induce recognizable features in any unintentional emissions.
III. METHODOLOGY
The overall objective of this study is to discriminate between several different micro-controllers based only on the features of experimentally collected unintentional RF emissions. A description of the experimental setup and analysis methodology used herein is provided below-including setup of the device under test, signal collection, feature extraction, and signal classification/device discrimination.
A. Experimental Setup
For this initial proof-of-concept, unintentional RF emissions of four 16-bit PIC micro-controllers (PIC24FJ64GA002) manufactured by Microchip Technology, Inc. are evaluated [8] . The PIC devices are representative of the low cost microcontrollers used in a variety of real-world commercial security applications such as garage door openers and remote keyless entry systems [9] and are easy to obtain through normal commercial channels. All four chips used were from the same manufacturing batch-thus, all layout and architectural features should be identical. The only anticipated physical differences between chips are those resulting from variations in the fabrication processes.
For device control and measurement, the micro-controllers are mounted on a Microchip 16-Bit 28-Pin Starter Development Board [10] . The circuit board is fixed in place on a measurement table using a custom fitted jig to minimize any lateral movement of the device during or between collections. The board was chosen for its clean layout which includes only a small number of on-board components, thus providing a relatively low-noise environment for collection. Where possible, on-board peripherals (LEDs and potentiometer) are disconnected via jumpers to further reduce any RF noise induced by their operation. The circuit board is powered from a standard lab DC power supply (Agilent E3631A) to reduce effects of any uncontrolled supply voltage fluctuations.
An on-board PIC18 micro-controller used to control the USB port for emulation of an RS232 serial interface could not be disabled. This second micro-controller was active during all collections and is physically located less than an inch from the primary micro-controller of interest. For future experiments a custom extension will be used to isolate the device under test from other on-board components.
The development board provides an external 7.37MHz crystal oscillator signal to the micro-controller. Each chip is configured with the on-board clocking system to generate an internal operating frequency of F OSC = 29.48 MHz from this signal [8] .
B. Signal Collection
Unintentional RF emissions from each micro-controller are collected using a near-field probe (1 GHz bandwidth) connected to a Lecroy 104-Xi-A oscilloscope as shown in and a maximum sample rate of 10 GSa/sec. All data presented here were collected at a sample rate of 1 GSa/sec.
The near-field probe is mounted on a computer-controlled motorized XYZ table for consistent placement of the probe relative to the device under test. The initial probe position was established by performing a two-dimensional scan of the surface of the first tested chip as it repeatedly executed a sequence of operations. The results of the scan were processed with a bandpass filter and analyzed to determine the location of maximal RF energy in the band corresponding to the known internal clock frequency of F OSC = 29.48 MHz. The probe and relative device positions remained fixed for all collections.
To improve collection efficiency and reduce required postprocessing for signal alignment, the PIC micro-controllers are controlled by a PC over an RS-232 serial interface. Each micro-controller repeatedly performs an identical sequence of operations on known (constant) data. At the start of the operation sequence, the micro-controller asserts a trigger signal on one of its general purpose input/output (GPIO) pins. The oscilloscope is configured to collect the RF signal for a fixed time interval each time the trigger is asserted. This enables precise identification and alignment of the individually collected signals without the need for extensive post-processing. Although a trigger signal is used for experimental efficiency, the signals observed have several obvious amplitude-response features that would allow similar results through automated post-processing and alignment without the aid of a trigger.
Initial experiments showed that the unintentional RF emissions exhibit some temperature-dependency as the device(s) warm up to their normal operating temperature. To compensate for these effects, each device is operated for 10 minutes to allow temperature stabilization before collecting the data used for fingerprinting. The sensitivity of fingerprints and classification performance under varying temperature conditions will be studied in future experiments. After the initial warm-up period, N S = 500 signals are collected from each chip as it repeatedly performs the same sequence of operations.
No attempt was made to isolate the data collection system from background environmental noise-all collections were performed in an office building environment with numerous co-located PCs and wireless devices.
C. Analysis Signal Generation
Signal collection is accomplished in a somewhat ideal laboratory environment-limiting outside influences and noise where possible. To assess the performance of the technique under less ideal conditions (noisier integrated systems, poor probe positioning, increased separation between sensor and system under test, etc.), the captured signals are power-scaled for analysis. To evaluate performance at lower SNR conditions the collected signals are combined with like-filtered additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) to achieve desired analysis SNRs of −10 ≤ SNR ≤ 27 dB in 1 dB increments (Fig. 1) . During pre-classification processing, the baseband signal and AWGN are digitally filtered using the same filter, i.e., a lowpass Butterworth filter with a -3 dB bandwidth of W BB = 80 MHz.
IV. FEATURE EXTRACTION AND DEVICE CLASSIFICATION

A. RF-DNA Feature Extraction and Statistical Fingerprint Generation
A variety of techniques can be used for feature extraction. The most straightforward approach is to directly use the instantaneous amplitude response-however, computational requirements for this approach increase rapidly. Based on its previous success in discriminating between communications devices, RF-DNA statistical fingerprinting is used herein for feature extraction, where the term fingerprinting alludes to a similarity to the well-known approach whereby humans are identified through analysis of their fingerprints. Statistical RF-DNA fingerprints (F) are features generated based on the statistical behavior of the instantaneous response(s) over some fixed regions-thus reducing computational requirements to a more manageable level.
1) Instantaneous Feature Extraction:
Using the SNR scaled analysis signal, three instantaneous responses are processed for each collection-instantaneous amplitude (IA) given by a (n), instantaneous phase (IP) given by φ (n), and instantaneous frequency (IF) given by f (n). To calculate φ (n) and f (n), the real valued signal is converted to complex I and Q data, s C(t) = s I(t) + s Q (t), using a Hilbert transform [11] . The IP is then:
and the IF (in Hz) is: 
Finally, the responses in (3) and (4) are normalized by their respective maximum magnitudes to account for any uncontrolled power variation.
2) Statistical Fingerprint Generation: After centering and normalization, four statistical features are generated for each instantaneous response: standard deviation (σ), variance (σ 2 ), skewness (γ) and kurtosis (κ) [4] . For an arbitrary centered and normalized sequence {x c (n)} having N x samples, the statistics are:
Each statistic is calculated over N R equal length, contiguous sub-regions spanning a selected sequence of samples {x (n)}. The region considered is emperically selected from the collected signal as the samples corresponding to the first N CL clock cycles worth of operations from the overall captured sequence. Initial experimentation confirmed that partitioning the samples into sub-regions corresponding to whole multiples of the number of clock cycles in the region of interest yields good results. No effort was made to align the sub-regions with clock edges since satisfactory results were obtained without such processing.
The results herein were obtained by partitioning the collected signals into N R = 16 sub-regions, selected from the first N CL clock cycles as illustrated in Fig. 2 . The full N CL clock cycles are used as an additional region giving N R + 1 = 17 total regional contributions for each device. For each subregion, the four statistics are concatenated to form regional distinct native attribute marker vectors:
where i = 1, 2, . . . , N R + 1. The RF-DNA marker vectors from (8) are concatenated to form a composite characteristic vector for each selected characteristic (C) as:
where the superscripted C denotes a specific characteristic response, i.e., a, φ, or f . Considering IA, IF, and IP; the final statistical fingerprint for each signal is a vector of 4 × (N R + 1) × 3 = 204 total elements, formed as:
An example of statistical RF-DNA fingerprint behavior across part numbers is presented in Fig. 3 for four PIC microcontrollers with identical part numbers (for scaled SNR = 9 dB). The RF-DNA markers in F are scaled, compressed and/or expanded, and quantized to a desired number of discrete levels spanning the interval [0, 1]. The quantized markers are stacked vertically to create an electrophoresis-like plot. These particular RF-DNA fingerprints highlight intra-part number variability, which is obvious from a visual inspection. At the depicted SNR, significant similarities are evident between parts A1 and A3 and between parts A2 and A4. Thus, intuitively, it is anticipated that the MDA/ML classifier will have greater difficulty distinguishing between the similar parts.
B. MDA-ML Classification
As with feature extraction, there are a large variety of techniques to choose from for signal classification. In general, most such techniques consist of a preparatory training phase followed by a decision or classification phase. Consistent with previous RF-DNA fingerprinting work, training is accomplished using an extension of Fischer's linear discriminant analysis known as multiple discriminant analysis (MDA). Device classification decisions are made using a maximum likelihood (ML) classifier based on Bayesian decision theory. Details of the MDA/ML process are omitted here in the interest of space, but can be found in [12] .
1) Cross Validation for Scaled SNR Peformance:
To assess performance at scaled SNRs, MDA/ML classification is implemented using Monte Carlo simulation with K-fold cross validation. Consistent with common practice [13] , a value of K = 5 is used such that the collection of N S = 500 statistical fingerprints (one for each sequence of operations) per device is divided into five blocks having N K = 100 fingerprints per block. Four blocks from each device are used for training and one block is "held out" for classification. The cross validation process is repeated five times until each of the five blocks has been "held out" and classified. Thus, each block of statistical fingerprints is used for training a total of four times. The results of all K = 5 folds are averaged to produce a final average correct classification percentage.
Monte Carlo simulation is used to assess the effect of varying channel SNR conditions on classification performance. For each Monte Carlo iteration, a total of N S independent AWGN realizations are generated, filtered, scaled and added to the collected signals prior to fingerprint generation. Following a total of N Z Monte Carlo iterations at each desired SNR, K = 5 fold MDA/ML classification results are averaged to obtain the overall average correct classification performance. The average percentage of correct classification presented in the figures is based on a total of N S ×N Z independent classification decisions. All results presented are based on N S = 500 signals per device and N Z = 10 AWGN realizations. CI = 95% confidence intervals are calculated to determine statistical significance of the classification performance for each analysis SNR. The average values and corresponding CIs are based on a total of N S × N Z = 500 × 25 = 12500 independent classification decisions for each device class. Note that these CIs only apply to the four particular devices studied, and are not intended to bound expected performance in general. The intent is to demonstrate the applicability of the RF-DNA fingerprinting technique in less ideal collection conditions.
The above procedure is repeated for each of four permutations, each of which trains and classifies using data collected from N D = 3 devices as shown in Table I. V. RESULTS A variety of initial pilot studies were performed to identify the most promising settings for the feature extraction and classification process, which were subsequently used to produce the final classification results. The results herein were generated using IA, IP, and IF statistical fingerprint features, which achieved the best performance (at 95% significance) of all tested parameter combinations, for all permutations. SNRs and manageable execution time for the fingerprinting and classification process. Fig. 4 shows overall average classification performance (across three devices at a time) for each of the four tested permutations. 95% CIs were calculated but are omitted from the plot for visual clarity since they are approximately the width of the data markers. The classifier achieves classification success of 99.9% at simulated SNRs ≥ 20 dB, and performance gradually decreases until it becomes equivalent to "random guessing" at SNRs ≤ −5 dB. Table II shows three selected confusion matrices for one of the experimental permutations. As expected based on the visual assessment of the RF-DNA plot in Fig. 3 , more confusion occurs between devices A1 and A3 (their corresponding fingerprints are the most similar visually). The utility of Fig. 3 for cross-permutation assessment is also demonstrated by noting that the results from Perm 2 and Perm 4 in Fig. 4 are consistently the poorest. This is directly attributable to device A2 and device A4 fingerprints being the most similar of the four shown in Fig. 3 .
It is important to note that the intra-part number classification measurements presented here were not replicated, and additional experiments are necessary to obtain statistically significant bounds on the expected performance for a wider range of devices. However, the initial results are very promising and merit further investigation. In particular, it is worthwhile to investigate how well the demonstrated performance will scale as the size of candidate group increases. Additionally, the work of Klein et al. suggests that further improvement may be realized using spectral-based approaches, to include Wavelet-based fingerprints [5] . Future experiments will focus on application of the spectral approach, scalability of the technique to other device classes or larger candidate groups, and exploitation of indirect emissions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Our results indicate that unintentional RF emissions due to the distinct native attributes of integrated circuits are a rich source of discriminatory information to uniquely identify the device that produced them. Furthermore, the effectiveness of RF-DNA statistical fingerprinting was demonsrated as a tool for the extraction of relevant features for this application.
For emissions obtained experimentally under laboratory conditions, the RF-DNA fingerprinting technique achieved 90-100% correct device classification at analysis SNRs ≥ 12 dB for all chips and permutations tested. Thus, the technique is promising for security and other applications requiring unique identification of a particular device. Furthermore, the high success rates indicate the technique is likely adaptable to less ideal environments and greater ranges while still providing acceptable performance.
While not comprehensive in terms of considering all available devices (manufacturer and/or model number) or engagement scenarios, these initial results are promising and suggest additional work is warranted.
